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FROM AFRICAN NEIGHBORS AND MEETING ZAMBIA’S CHALLENGES 
 
*Stephen Kabwe and David Tschirley 
 
MAIN POINTS 
1.  Smallholder farmers in Africa require reliable access to purchased production inputs and credit 
to take advantage of export opportunities from production of cotton. 
2.  Unregulated and poorly coordinated markets for cotton, production inputs and credit have too 
often failed to deliver sustainable production finance to farmers for cotton production resulting 
in a variety of different approaches to these problems among African countries. 
3.  Among the countries studied, approaches have varied from State monopolies to private markets 
with several large firms managing to achieve temporary duopolies. 
4.  Zambia has been relatively successful in dealing with the input-credit needs of cotton farmers 
for periods of time but the system has been unsustainable, breaking down from time to time.  
5.  Currently the Zambia government and private sector participants are proposing highly 
collaborative regulation of the sector driven by all stakeholders. The revised Cotton Act 
provides a framework under which this may be able to happen in Zambia and recent activities 
of ZACOP, in collaboration with CAZ are very much in this spirit.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION: Concerns about input 
credit supply have long been at the centre of 
debates regarding cotton sector organization in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This concern has been 
based on four widely appreciated facts: 1) that 
cotton production requires substantial use of 
external inputs: 2) that smallholder farmers are 
typically cash constrained and find it difficult 
to finance input purchases; 3) that input 
markets are very weak in rural Africa, 
especially for specialized items such as treated 
seed, and finally; 4) that rural credit markets 
for agriculture in Africa are nearly non-
existent. Addressing these problems to ensure 
adequate access to inputs by smallholder cotton 
farmers has been an ongoing challenge in every 
cotton producing country of Africa for as long 
as the crop has been produced.   
 
OBJECTIVE:  This Policy Synthesis draws 
on recent comparative work across nine 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Zambia, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Cameroon, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin) to 




provision systems observed on the continent, 
and to assess how Zambia compares to its  
neighbors in this regard.  The paper also 
outlines key policy implications for Zambia. 
 
METHODS: The comparative study 
developed a typology of African cotton sectors, 
developed expectations regarding the likely 
performance of each on various measures, and 
then assessed performance against these 
expectations. The typology identified national 
(public) monopolies in Mali and Cameroon, 
local (private) monopolies in Mozambique and 
Burkina Faso, concentrated systems (few 
private buyers of seed cotton) in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, and competitively structured 
systems (many private buyers) in Tanzania and 
Uganda.   
 
Table 1 provides summary information on the 
input supply systems in the study countries. 
Table 2 summarizes findings, comparing 
observed against expected performance across 
the various types of cotton sectors, and 
highlighting especially salient facts. The rest of   2
this brief provides background for interpreting 
Table 2. 
 
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIES SHOW 
SIMILARITIES, BUT CAMEROON 
PERFORMS MUCH BETTER:  This system 
is found in Cameroon and Mali. Under this 
system the purchase of seed cotton is regulated, 
there is no competition allowed. Only one 
Government agency is allowed to buy the seed 
cotton.  The provision of cotton inputs is done 
by the Government agency to the farmer 
organization through in-kind system. The 
standard input package consists of treated seed, 
urea, compound, pesticides and some 
herbicides and it costs US$119/ha for Mali and 
US$123/ha for Cameroon. Credit repayment is 
around 90%.  
 
LOCAL MONOPOLY SYSTEM: Burkina 
Faso and Mozambique practice this system. 
Competition is not allowed in the purchase of 
seed cotton either. There is more than one 
cotton buyer under this system unlike in the 
Government Monopoly System which has only 
one. Each buyer is assigned an exclusive 
geographical area in which to buy seed cotton. 
The provision of inputs by the firms to the 
farmers is on in-kind basis within the 
operational area/s.  
 
In Mozambique, there is limited involvement 
of farmer organization in negotiating with 
ginners on prices of seed cotton or provision of 
other services. Key lessons from 
Mozambique’s experience are, first, that a local 
monopoly system does not eliminate the 
possibility of serious credit default crises. 
Second, policy makers in local monopoly 
systems must choose their companies carefully. 
All companies in Mozambique face the same, 
very weak, regulatory capacity of government. 
Yet some have chosen to invest aggressively in 
improved input supply and extension, while 
others have operated for many years much like 
the new entrants in Zimbabwe, providing 
minimal quantities of poor quality input. 
 
A key point to keep in mind as Burkina Faso 
moves down its reform path is that, despite the 
very developed structure and strong coverage 
of farmer groups within cotton areas, 
operational capacities remain very weak. While 
they do receive and distribute inputs to 
members and organize the cotton market, 
neither UNPCB nor its regional unions are in a 
position to take over the importation and 
distribution of input to villages. Until this can 
happen, seasonal input credit from cotton 
companies will be critical to the sector’s 
success. 
 
COMPETITIVE SECTORS: The pre-reform 
cooperative-based cotton systems in Tanzania 
and Uganda led quickly after reform to highly 
competitive markets with 20 to 30 independent 
buyers competing for farmer production. Price 
competition was intense and farm prices 
improved, but each country witnessed the 
collapse of its input supply and extension 
systems. Initial efforts in both countries 
involved removing input supply from the 
private sector, to allow competition in the 
output market: Tanzania’s Cotton Development 
Fund (CDF) created in 1999, and Uganda’s 
similar collaborative approach between ginners 
and the country’s public Cotton Development 
Organization (CDO). Each approach achieved 
some success but failed after two years due to 
management and design problems. 
 
Since these initial failed attempts, the two 
countries have moved in dramatically different 
directions. Uganda has eliminated competition 
in the output market to facilitate input supply 
and extension by ginners (see Baffes, 
background paper on Uganda, 2007 for more 
detail), while Tanzania has maintained a 
competitive output market and used innovative 
approaches to provide some minimal level of 
input to farmers (Poulton and Maro, 
background paper on Tanzania, 2007). 
Uganda’s zonal quota system features 
collaborative production planning among 2-3 
ginners in each of 11 zones, prohibits cotton 
movement across zones, and facilitates sale of 
inputs at 50 percent of cost, with the subsidy 
implicitly collected in the price paid to farmers. 
Extension is a heavy focus in the system, with 
7,000 demonstration plots and training days 
financed two-thirds by ginners and one-third by 
USAID. Despite these major efforts at input 
supply and extension, production in Uganda 
has not consistently risen above 20,000 to 
25,000 tons of lint. 
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Mechanisms for input credit 
supply 









Adequacy/quality of package 
received on credit  Cost  Credit repayment rates 
Mali  National 
monopoly 
In-kind credit by CMDT to 
farmer cooperatives; relatively 
little operational involvement by 
farmers 
Negligible 
~ 100% cotton 
farmers, >90% all 
farmers in cotton 
zones 
~ 100% 
Treated seed, urea, compound, 
pesticides, some herbicides; 
questions re seed quality and 
appropriateness of fert rec’s  
Std. pkg US$119/ha (“at 
cost”) 35%-45% of mean 
prod’n value 
95%. Fell to 90% as 
early as 2001 
Cameroon  National 
monopoly 
In-kind credit jointly managed & 
financed by SODECOTON & 
farmer apex. Decreasing 





~ 100% cotton 
farmers, >90% all 
farmers in cotton 
zones 
~ 100% 
Treated seed, urea, compound, 
pesticides, some herbicides. Little or 
no adjustment to differing agroeco 
conditions 
Std. pkg US$123/ha (“at 
cost”) 35%-45% of mean 
prod’n value 
95%-99%. Fell to 90% 
2006 
Burkina Faso  Local 
monopoly 
In-kind credit by 3 companies to 
farmers, with some (limited) 








~ 100% cotton 
farmers, 85% of all 
farmers across 
whole cotton zone 
~ 100% 
Treated seed, urea, compound, 
pesticides, some herbicides. Little or 
no adjustment to differing agroeco 
conditions 
Std. pkg US$171/ha 
45%-55% mean prod’n 
value. Seed sold at 55% of 
cost 
95% 
Mozambique  Local 
 monopoly 
In-kind credit from ginning 
companies; highly varying 
quality; negligible involvement 
of farmer orgs  
Negligible 
~ 100% cotton 
farmers, >80% all 
farmers in key 
cotton zones 
~ 0% 
Highly variable across companies. 
Mix of treated & untreated seed. 
Some pesticides. Little or no 
fertilizer 
Highly variable. Typically 
US$10-US$30/ha, 10%-





In-kind credit from main ginning 
companies; no operational role to 
date for farmer orgs 
Negligible 
~ 100% cotton 
farmers, 30%-35% 








Treated seed, pesticides (5-6 
sprays), some foliar fert for 2-3 
main companies; seed & limited 
pesticides from others 
US$20-US$30/ha, 10%-
20% mean prod’n value; 
some evidence that sold 
above market rates 
Typically 85%-98%. 






In-kind credit from ginners; 
highly varying quality; main 
schemes (Cotco, Cargill) highly 
selective of best farmers, others 
get mostly poor farmers 




farmers (up from 
40% early 2000s). 
70%-80% of all 







Cotco: treated seed, fertilizers, 
chemicals. Some newer companies 
only seed and limited chemicals 
Cotco $237/ha, 43% mean 
prod’n value. Others: 
US$50-US$90/ha, 33%-
39% mean prod’n value 
90% Has fallen since 
early 2000s 
Tanzania Competitive 
No input credit; passbook system 







(Passbook, not credit) No treated 
seed; chemical qt’s inadeq for full 




depending on passbook 
















































































Uganda  Hybrid 
(Competitive)
Cash sale by ginners at 50% 








sale) ~ 100% cotton 
farmers 
<10% 
(Implicit credit) Highly variable, as 
farmers free to purchase input they 
wish. All use treated seed. Nearly all 
use some insecticides 
US$6-US$8 for most 
farmers, 6%-18% of prod’n
value. <10% uses ~ 
US$110, 20% of prod’n 
value 
 
Note: Uganda’s structure is competitive but its conduct currently is not, due to the regional quota system. It is therefore classified as a hybrid sector.
 Table 2.  Summary Assessment of Performance on Input Supply and Extension, by Sector Type 
 
System type  Expected performance  Realized performance  Comments 
Competitive  Little or no ability to provide input credit 
or extension 
Input: Expectations partially 
confirmed. Early failed efforts in 
Uganda and Tanzania. Some success in 
later efforts. In Zimbabwe, coverage 
increased but service quality 
deteriorated. 
Extension: Expectations fully 
confirmed in Tanzania; more success in 
later efforts in Uganda 
• Current approach in Uganda achieves some success in 
both input supply and extension by eliminating 
competition for seed cotton (hybrid system) 
• Tanzania does not limit competition, relies on “forced” 
savings, but provides small quantities of chemicals and no 
fertilizer 
• No extension in TZ 
• Serious questions regarding long-term ability raise 
productivity (and quality) Î questionable ability to 
compete long-term in world market 
• System may be especially unsustainable in countries with 
less fertile soils than Tanzania 
Concentrated, Market Based 
Greater ability than competitive systems 
to provide basic input package on credit 
and some extension 
Input: Expectations largely confirmed, 
but systems subject to structural 
instability and periodic default crises 
Extension: Uneven performance across 
companies 
• Key question: can effective coregulatory approaches 
emerge and persist in these countries, facilitating self-
regulated competition that allows input credit supply? 
Zambia and Zimbabwe currently attempting to do this, 
without moving to a local monopoly system 
Local Monopoly 
Greater ability than competitive systems 
to provide input credit and extension and 
ensure repayment; but lack of competition 
means firm “culture” and regulatory 
framework especially important 
Input: Expectations largely confirmed, 
including variable performance across 
firms. Provide support to larger share of 
all farmers than do concentrated, 
market-based systems 
Extension: Depends even more than 
input supply on company; some in 
Mozambique provide none 
• Choose companies carefully! 
• Multinational firms observed to deliver superior 
performance in Mozambique, with stronger focus on 
productivity and quality 
• In absence of strong producer organizations, regulation 
falls on government, which will often be ineffective 
• Credit default crises can still occur 
National Monopoly 
Greatest ability to provide broad access 
and ensure repayment; adequacy/quality 
indeterminate, dependent on management 
and firm culture 
Input: Expectations confirmed, though 
performance in WCA heavily 
dependent on good management and 
substantial outside assistance 
Extension: Tendency for messages to 
become obsolete and not adapted to 
sub-local conditions 
•  Incentive problems in monopoly can undermine 
performance over time 
•  Tendency not to update input package over time, 
leading to cost squeeze for farmers 
•  Political interference a recurrent problem in Mali and 
Burkina Faso (where SOFITEX still controls 85% of 
market), leading to other problems (e.g., pricing) that can 
undermine input supply and extension 
•  Operational and financial strength of farmer organizations 
crucial to successful transition to another sector type; 
Cameroon best placed in this regard 
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In hindsight, it appears clear that a short-lived 
production boom in 2004 and 2005 was due 
primarily to high prices in the two preceding 
years (Baffes, background paper on Uganda, 
2007). 
 
Under Tanzania’s passbook system, farmers 
selling cotton receive a stamp in their 
passbook which entitles them to a value of 
seed or chemicals
1 the next year proportional 
to the amount of cotton they sold. For most 
farmers, the entitlement amounts to one or 
two chemical sprays and some seed the 
following year. The system is funded by a 
levy paid by ginners to CDF, which funds the 
importation of insecticides by private 
companies. Based on field interviews, 
Poulton and Maro (this project) suggest that 
the system has been “one contributory factor 
toward the major resurgence in cotton 
production in 2004 and 2005,” but concludes 
that “the system can make only a limited 
contribution to the intensification of cotton 
production in Tanzania,” since it can finance 
only limited insecticide sprays and no 
fertilizer applications.  
 
CONCENTRATED SYSTEM: This is 
system where competition is allowed for the 
purchase of seed cotton. Only a few buyers 
are in the system. Countries with this type of 
system are Zambia and Zimbabwe though the 
later is becoming competitive because there 
are more buyers in the system now. 
Zimbabwe transitioned during the 1980s 
from a sector dominated by white commercial 
farmers to one with almost no such farmers, 
while building systems for effective input 
credit supply and extension assistance to a 
substantial minority of the new smallholder 
farmers. Cottco, the private company that 
emerged out of the government-owned CMB 
with a market share of 70 percent to 80 
percent, continued this effective performance 
into at least the early 2000s and enjoyed 
credit repayment of 95 percent or higher in 
most years. 
 
Between 2001 and 2004, the number of seed 
cotton buyers in Zimbabwe rose from 5 to 11, 
spurred by a fall in the real prices paid to 
 
                                                
1 Seed has so far been included in the system but may 
be removed next year. 
farmers by the major players
2. Credit default 
increased, and Cottco dramatically reduced 
input credit in 2004/05. Though the company 
has since expanded its system again, credit 
default remains a major problem. Draft 
regulations to deal with the situation were 
developed in 2004, but never enacted. For the 
2006/07 season, the sector is trying various 
approaches, including establishment of a code 
of good conduct that cotton companies must 
adhere to if they are to receive an export 
permit in future years. 
 
An unusual result of Zimbabwe’s move to a 
less concentrated system is that a 
substantially larger share of farmers received 
some form of input credit in 2006 than in the 
early 2000s. Whereas about 40 percent of 
growers received credit from Cottco or 
another company in 2002, nearly 95 percent 
received some type of support in 2006. 
However, regulation was a key driver of this 
result, and newer companies tend to provide 
seed of uncertain quality, and little or no 
insecticide.  
 
As noted above, the entry of these new 
companies was also accompanied by large 
increases in credit default among farmers. In 
an echo of patterns seen. In Zambia, and 
especially in Mozambique widespread 
provision of very inadequate input packages 
has often been used as pretext to buy 
aggressively (and indiscriminately) during the 
harvest.  
 
Zambia’s cotton sector built relatively 
effective input credit and extension systems 
in the years following reform in 1994, 
consistently providing farmers with high 
quality treated seed, four- to six treatments of 
insecticides, and (for the top 20 percent or 30 
percent of farmers) foliar feed fertilizers on 
100 percent credit terms. Typical credit 
repayment was above 95 percent for Clark, 
and above 85 percent for Dunavant. As a 
result, the sector has seen slow but steady 
rises in the yields of established farmers and a 
near tripling of the total number of farmers 
 
2 For more detail, see Tschirley et al. 2006 
(forthcoming) and Poulton and Hanyani-Mlambo, 
background paper on Zimbabwe cotton sector, World 
Bank, 2007.   6
                                                
growing cotton over the past decade 
(Tschirley et al, 2004). 
 
Despite the financial strength and high market 
shares of the two main companies, the sector 
has experienced two severe credit default 
crises since reform. The crisis of 1998-2000 
was overcome as Dunavant and Clark 
strengthened their input credit supply and 
recovery and (especially for Clark/Cargill) 
extension systems, and demonstrated to most 
farmers the benefits of remaining loyal to the 
company. As a result, credit default receded 
as a problem, and production boomed through 
the 2006 harvest season. The second credit 
default crisis occurred in 2006 and 2007, 
again spurred by the entry of new 
companies
3. Unlike in 1998 - 2000, it appears 
likely that at least some of these new 
companies will be able to remain important 
players in the sector. 
 
In Zambia, as in Zimbabwe, the sector is 
struggling to find a regulatory approach to 
deal with these stresses. Dunavant and 
Cargill, along with two of the emerging 
companies and farmers as represented by 
Cotton Association of Zambia, are pushing 
for submission by the government to 
Parliament of the revised Cotton Act, which 
would create a cotton board with power to 
regulate the sector but not to participate as a 
buyer or seller.  
 
Also as in Zimbabwe, ginners and buyers 
would have to abide by specified rules of 
conduct to be granted a license, and could be 
subject to fines and seizure of cotton if shown 
to be involved in the promotion of side 
selling.  
 
A key point which emerges from this review 
is that concentrated, market-based systems 
may be unstable, with a recurring tendency to 
move to a more competitive structure. 
Tipping points may exist, in which the entry 
of two or three additional companies can 
dramatically change the prospects of 
coordination for input supply and extension 
(and quality control; see next chapter). As the 
number of players rises, input credit is the 
 
3 A sharp appreciation of the Kwacha from late 2006 
through May or June 2007 was also a major factor. 
first service to suffer, certainly in quality (in 
Zimbabwe) and also in the number of farmers 
served (in Zambia).  
 
A key question which emerges is whether 
these systems will be successful in their 
efforts to establish enforceable rules of the 
game that ensure good pricing performance   
while safeguarding credit repayment.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: Results from 
the comparative study show that, despite 
Zambia’s relatively good performed well in 
the area of input credit provision because of 
the efforts of the two main cotton ginners and 
complemented in a modest way by the Cotton 
Outgrower Credit Scheme run by CDT.  
 
However, the concentrated system found in 
Zambia is unstable, with rapid entry of new 
players periodically creating credit default 
crisis and undermining input credit provision. 
Therefore, to avoid problems requires highly 
collaborative regulation of the sector driven 
by all stakeholders. There are encouraging 
ideas towards a productive way forward, but 
significant implementation efforts will be 
needed.  Firstly, the revised Cotton Act 
provides a framework under which this may 
be able to happen in Zambia. And secondly, 
recent activities of ZACOP, in collaboration 
with CAZ in pre-planting price negotiation 
are very much in this spirit. 
 
 
This Policy Synthesis draws directly from Tschriley et al 
(2007). “Comparative Analysis of Organization and 
Performance of African Cotton Sector: Learning from 
Experience of Cotton Sector Reform in Africa”, forthcoming 
from World Bank 
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